*Planning without action is FUTILE; but action without planning is FATAL!
INDIAN ARMY PROVES IT IS PEERLESS IN MOUNTAIN WARFARE TOO!
1. POLITICAL BACKING MAKES THE DIFFERENCE
1.1. With immaculate Preemptive Planning and stunning Execution , Indian Army , by the crack of dawn on August 29-30, Indian forces had taken dominant positions on some key heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), snaking through the south bank of Pangong Tso to Rechin La near Rezang La.
1.2. The Planning was on even while the disengagement talks were on as the army knew well that the Dragon was unpredictable.
1.3. This move threatened key Chinese positions on its side of the LAC, and provided India a bulwark against lost ground on the north bank of the lake.
1.4. Plans for such a move, a source in the security establishment said, had the political go-ahead from Delhi because there was realisation there that Beijing was not serious about completing disengagement of troops.
2. This operation to reach the unoccupied heights took almost a month of careful planning — from the drawing board to implementation on the field.
3. CHINESE DUPLICITY
3.1.But by July 14, the fourth round of talks, it was clear that China was not pulling back its troops fully from Gogra Post and Hot Spring areas, and the ridges of the Fingers area on the north bank of Pangong Tso.
3.2. When the August 2 meeting ended with China not even ready to accept it had violated Indian territory on Pangong Tso’s north bank, the Indian establishment realised that military action to wrest some tactical advantage was the only option.
4. WINNING GROUNDWORK
4.1. The top brass and field officers sat with the drawing board.
4.2. Chinese vulnerabilities were worked out vis-à-vis our own strength. Locations of tactical advantage were discussed.
4.3.Strategies to achieve them were worked upon.
4.4. Each and every move, to the last detail, was mapped. And just before the operations, reconnaissance was carried out.
4.5.It took close to a month to do all this, in complete secrecy.
5.1.“There were three forces at our disposal — the Special Frontier Force (SFF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and, of course, the Indian Army.
5.2.Units were specifically picked to take over particular heights with SFF commandos leading at many places,” an officer of the security establishment said.
5.3. “The Chinese continue to dominate Black Top and Helmet Top, but we have surrounded them on heights around it”.
6. OCCUPATION OF STRATEGIC HEIGHTS IN CHUSHUL SECTOR
6.1. The positions we have taken in the Chushul sector on heights such as Magar Hill and Gurung Hill has exposed China’s Moldo garrison and the Spanggur Gap, strategically very important to China.
6.2. The Gurung Hill and Magar Hill are located north and south of the Spanggur Gap, and Indian positions can dominate the pass to effectively close it for any Chinese movement.
6.3. In 1962, China had used the 2-km wide pass to launch an offensive against Indian forces.
Reference Link : https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-relation-lac-border-dispute-pla-troops-6593834/